Did She Say That?

http://www.financeasia.com/article.aspx?CIaNID=118130
Dubai World creditors await court definition of Sukuk
At issue with Nakheel's sukuk is how a court will handle the restructuring, note observers familiar with Islamic finance. Much depends on the structure of the instrument. A court could declare the instrument the equivalent of a conventional bond with repayment terms comparable to international norms, or it could find the sukuk to be structured as either a mudharabah (profit-sharing) product or a musyarakah (a partnership involving profit- and loss-sharing) product, both of which would likely involve the creditors sharing some of the issuer's losses.

Creditors stand to benefit if a sukuk is declared essentially the same as a conventional bond, whereas the issuer stands to benefit if it is defined first and foremost as an instrument that is compliant with Shar'iah (Islamic law) -- and thus subject to the idea of profit-sharing.

"The whole presentation of the structure is one where investors are meant to receive a share of the profits and not interest on debts - two very different obligations," said Khalid Howladar, a senior credit officer at Moody's. "It could be argued that, because an issuer is not generating profits, it should not have to pay sukuk investors."

Not everyone agrees: "This is a credit issue, not an Islamic issue," said Raja Teh Maimunah, global head of Islamic markets at Bursa Malaysia. "A sukuk is a bond and issuers need to pay back the money they borrowed."

The quandary faced by the holders of Nakheel’s Sukuk has been well documented and discussed in recent weeks. At this juncture, how they will move forward with the restructuring depends on how the courts define this instrument called Sukuk.

In the above article, the global head of Islamic markets at Bursa Malaysia claims that a Sukuk is a bond. I find it appalling that a person of such stature as Raja Teh with all her experience can come up with such a statement which IMHO seriously undermines the principles of Islamic finance.

In case she forgot, a Sukuk is defined as follows:

“Certificates of equal value representing after closing subscription, receipt of the value of the certificates and putting it to use as planned, common title to shares and rights in tangible assets, usufructs and services, or equity of a given project or equity of a special investment activity” by Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI, Standard 17).

“A document or certificate that represents the value of an asset” by The Securities Commission (SC).

A bond is defined as a fixed interest financial asset. Bonds pay the bearer a fixed amount a specified end date. A discount bond pays the bearer only at the ending date, while a coupon bond pays the bearer a fixed amount over a specified interval (month, year, etc.) as well as paying a fixed amount at the end date.

Click here for a comparison between Sukuks and Bonds.

If Sukuk is a bond, why bother with the Shariah structures & approvals, legal documentations etc.? Why bother calling it a Sukuk?

Let’s put it this way, Sukuks and bonds are like fish and chicken, they are both sources of food and can be cooked the same way but they will NEVER look the same, taste the same, they will never be the same.

It is a credit issue, so going forward, let’s use Nakheel/Dubai World as an example and learn from it. The first and most important lesson to remember is to structure a Sukuk as a Sukuk and not as a bond. And that includes evaluating the credit from the Sukuk perspective and not the bond perspective.

For as long as the Islamic finance industry is lead by people with a conventional worldview on Islamic finance, it will never break away from being a conventional product with an Arabic name.

Organised Tawarruq not a perfect structure

In its basic form, Tawarruq is an asset sale to a purchaser with deferred payment terms. The purchaser then sells the asset to a third party to get funds. Organised Tawarruq is similar although the transactions are executed through banks.

Reuters reports Shariah adviser Rusni Hassan saying that Organised Tawarruq as it is currently practised is not ideal from the Shariah's viewpoint.

According to the report (Nov 4, 2009), Rusni opines that organised Tawarruq should avoid specifying beforehand the parties' obligations under the contract although this protects their legal rights, backing a divisive Fiqh Academy ruling that had thrown the industry into turmoil. She objects to organised Tawarruq because the two contracts are in one when they should be independent of each other.

I agree with her views but I foresee it will further divide the industry especially when respected scholars like Nizam Yaqubi and Akram Laldin see no harm in organised Tawarruq.

Other scholars who disapprove of Tawarruq include Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi and Monzer Kahf.

Siddiqi views Tawarruq to be identical to interest based loans both from the functional and macroeconomic perspective. His justification for categorising Tawarruq as non-compliant is due to its harms (mafasid) being greater that its benefits (masalih). He lists;
1) creation of excessive debt;
2) exchange of money with more money in future, which is unfair in view of the risk and uncertainty involved;
3) debt proliferation, which is liken to gambling and speculation;
4) inflationary expansion;
5) inequity in the distribution of income and wealth;
6) greater instability in the economy; and
7) inefficient allocation of resources.
as the many harms of Tawarruq.

Kahf opines that Tawarruq is worse than the practice of interest-based loan legally and economically.

I have to disagree (with apologies) with Sheikhs Yaqubi and Akram on the permissibility of Tawarruq. Being of limited knowledge, I depend on the views and opinions of the scholars and in this case the arguments presented by Siddiqi make more sense to me.

Islamic Derivative Contracts Soon?

Reuters reports that the first template for over-the-counter Islamic derivative contract will be launched this year or by early 2010. The contract is expected to pave the way for quicker and cheaper Islamic risk management and more frequent cross-currency transactions.

According to Ijlal Ahmed Alvi, chief executive officer of the International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM), "It's a completely new instrument. We have done the consultative work. Now what we are waiting for is the Sharia meeting... some time in December". The IIFM, an industry body backed by the central banks of several Muslim countries, has been working with the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) on the contract. Once in place, the new Islamic derivatives contract is expected to initially attract at least 150 players.

Scholars are however split on the legitimacy of derivatives; some see them as permissible instruments to hedge risks but others dismiss them as speculative transactions, which Islam forbids.

My contention is that derivative instruments is not the only solution to hedge of risks. There is no need for Shariah based finance to mimic each and every conventional instrument. Isn’t there any indigenous Shariah based risk management tool?

Tendering for Short Term Papers

In the Malaysian debt market, a short term bond is called a Commercial Paper (CP). A CP is either issued via a tender or private placement. In a tender, the CPs will be issued to the highest bidder(s) making the tender process a platform for investors to demand a rate of return that matches their risk appetite and/or investment objective. The basis for the bids is on the credit worthiness of the issuer. Once the CPs is issued to the winning bidders, the issuer is compelled to pay the promised returns to the investors.

Surprisingly, the same tender process applies to the Islamic CPs (ICP). I can understand if the ICPs are issued based on the Ijarah or Murabahah contract, there should not any problem with individually setting the rental or mark-up. The problem is when Musharakah and Mudharabah based CPs are subjected to the same procedure. I just cannot comprehend how an investor can demand, upfront, a fixed profit from a Musharakah/Mudharabah venture. It is totally against Shariah principles and contravenes the “profit and loss sharing” (PLS) model. Although the transaction documents clearly states that the returns are merely “expected” profits but in all likelihood, the projection will be met, 100% of the time.

What’s worse, the ICP is (usually) issued at a discount to nominal value and the issue price is calculated in accordance with the formula specified in Part III, Section 5 of the FAST Rules, the same formula used to calculate the discount for the conventional CPs.

Shariah based instruments and transactions may not be compatible with conventional platform all the time, it must un on its own unique platform.

So much for being in the forefront of Islamic finance.

Liquidity Management

Conventional wisdom states that money must generate returns all the time, even when it is idle. Hence the creation of the money market, a place for trading idle money. When there is a trade, there will be a price; and the price of money is the interest rate. What determines the interest rate? Other than the forces of demand and supply; monetary policy, expectation of changes in the base rate, inflation also influences the price of money.

The money market is also a place where mismatches in assets and liabilities are rectified. Banks with excess funds (liabilities > assets) will sell (lend) the idle cash in the money market and banks facing a shortage of funds (assets > liability) will buy (borrow) money from the market.

The money market is therefore crucial to ensure the banking system and the economy works smoothly.

Why then do I say that the money market is an anomaly in Shariah based finance?

Firstly (I’m already sounding like a broken record), my understanding is, Shariah prohibits the trading of money because money is not a commodity; it is merely a tool to facilitate trade. Money is potential capital, useful only when put into productive economic use.

Secondly, money is a ribawi item, one which cannot be exchanged unless it is equal in value and transacted spot. The following hadith is the basis of this ruling.

The Prophet s.a.w. said “gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates and salt for salt should be exchanged like for like, equal for equal and hand to hand [on the spot]. If the types of the exchanged commodities are different, then sell them as you wish, if they are exchanged on the basis of a hand-to-hand transaction. (Sahih Muslim)

Therefore, the act of lending overnight money at 3.2%, contravenes the above hadith because (1) the exchanged value differs and (2) it is not exchanged on spot basis.

Then Tawarruq came along. Liquidity management in a Shariah compliant manner is now possible via the buying and selling of commodities (which does not leave the warehouse and is reused again and again for subsequent transactions). The route is longer but the objective is met nonetheless, money is exchanged in different amounts at different times, made “permissible” due to the presence of the trade. It sounds like a hilah to me because the whole transaction is undertaken merely to circumvent Shariah ruling on riba. It also does not entail any direct economic activity. The biggest beneficiary is the commodity brokers, getting paid for facilitating a seemingly pointless transaction.

No doubt, there will be times of excess liquidity and it does not make economic sense to keep the potential capital idle without generating any income.

This excess liquidity can be channelled towards financing short term projects or providing short term funding. Trade financing would be a good place to start. Retailers/traders usually buy from suppliers or wholesalers or manufacturers on credit terms. Banks could offer a short term murabahah facility to finance this type of transactions in the form of a 3 day, 1 week, 2 week or 30 day murabahah financing. This would channel the excess liquidity towards funding real economic activity.

Another way to absorb the excess liquidity is by way of a short term lease. A clearing house needs to be set up. The clearing house shall own a pool of tenanted properties. When a bank (or anyone for that matter) has excess liquidity, they will purchase property from the clearing house and the rental will be paid to them. When they need the cash, the property will be sold back to the clearing house at market value. In most cases, the purchase and sale price would be the same as it is quite unlikely for real estate values to fluctuate very much in the span of a few weeks.

Both methods entails actual economic activity and the returns from the investment are generated from actual economic activity.

There is always a Shariah based solution to every financial need. If there isn’t, the financial transaction is probably not in tandem with Shariah in the first place.

Islamic Structured Investment

An Islamic Structured Investment (or deposit) is an investment product which is linked to or benchmarked against a Shariah compliant underlying range of performance indicators such as equities, real estate or commodities. There are some Shariah compliant structured products in the market which is benchmarked against (Shariah compliant) indices, foreign exchange and even inter-bank offered rates. The returns from the structured investment are therefore dependant upon the performance of the underlying range of performance indicators.

A structured investment can either be principal protected or non-principal protected.

A Shariah compliant structured investment works the same way as their conventional counterpart, the only difference is in the nature of the underlying asset, it must not contravene Shariah principles.

The mechanics are as follows:
The promoter pool funds via the sales of the structured investment. The contract between the promoter and investor is usually that of a wakalah fi istithmar (investment agent).

For a principal protected structured investment, the promoter will split the funds into two, one portion will be invested in the Islamic money market or a fixed income instrument (zero coupon / discounted Sukuk) and a smaller portion will be utilised to purchase an option, applying the Urbun contract and referenced against the underlying.

The investment in the (Shariah compliant) fixed income instrument is for the purpose of reserving the principal investment and the option will provide the upside, if any.

The capital protection will only be enjoyed if the investment is held to maturity. Any premature withdrawal will result in the investment being valued at market and the investor will incur mark-to-market losses.

The maths is basically, allocate a portion based on the prevailing (profit?) rates that will ensure the capital is 100% preserved at the end of the investment tenure. The balance will be used to purchase an option. The participation rate (in the upside) of the option may not be 100% as it will depend on whether the balance after setting aside for the money market/fixed income Sukuk is sufficient. In some cases, the participation rate is less than 100% meaning the option holder is not entitled to all of the gains made from exercising the option.

Let’s dissect the structure.
Pooling of funds for investment purposes are perfectly fine and Shariah compliant.
Investing a portion to preserve capital – this would be done via the money market using Tawarruq. My stand on Tawarruq can be found here

Capital preservation is often a sticky issue with Shariah, if economic conditions go against the investment, what right does the investors have to demand full capital preservation? It becomes a zero sum game and there will be one party in the transaction who will lose out at the expense of the other. Shariah based finance is about justice and equity, sharing of profits and losses.

Buying an option using Urbun*, putting a deposit/downpayment to earn rights to purchase an asset – sounds compliant but are indices, foreign exchange and even inter-bank offered rates Shariah compliant assets? Does buying an intangible asset serve any economic purpose? I have no issues on Urbun for tangible assets like property or commodities.

My take on structured investment is it sort of looks and sounds like a mutual fund with a derivative (the option) and capital preservation elements. My views on derivatives can be found here and I’m of the opinion that capital should be positively correlated to the economy, preserving it would entail going against economic trends and causing some party somewhere to suffer more losses than necessary.


*Urbun is sometimes spelled Arboon

Article review – “Is AAOIFI Ban on Musharaka Sukuk Justified?”

A not so comprehensive review on the above article which appeared in the May/June issue of the Islamic Banker.

The title itself is misleading – AAOIFI did not ban Sukuk Musharakah, it is banning the current model of Sukuk Musharakah which has the elements of purchase undertaking (PU) and guarantees.

The gist of this article is based on the views of one mazhab overriding the views of the other mazhabs.

Badlisyah (BAG) – arguments for the Malaysian market player from the Malaysian (Shafie) perspective.

P.10, Col 1, para 3, line 4 – contradiction, Musharakah is NOT a debt instrument. It should not be treated as such as it defeats the purpose of structuring a Sukuk based on the principles of Musharakah.

P.10, Col 1, para 3, lines 6 to 10 – the Malaysian investors, market, legal and regulatory framework unfortunately does not support the Musharakah model. It is still a debt based market with debt based regulatory framework.

My opinion on the PU – giving debt characteristics to an equity based instrument. This is to satisfy the demands of the investing public who wants an “Islamic” structure but also wants the features of a debt.

My opinion on AAOIFI’s announcement - it should not create a panic, there should be a consensus on the “effective” date as in anything issued prior to the announcement should be given an exemption from the ruling.

Permissibility of debt trading – it is true that differing mazhabs have differing views, this is where the industry needs a respected global body to lay down the law as to which mazhab prevails. Alternatively, allow the practices of all mazhabs and leave it to the market to decide whether they want to subscribe to a certain issuance or not. In this case, each Sukuk issuance has to come with an additional label – that of the approving mazhab.

True sale versus Beneficial sale – BAG argues that it is merely an accounting issue. He contends that a beneficial sale is as good as a true sale (despite the asset still remaining in the balance sheet of the seller). The purpose of a sale in an Islamic transaction is to give absolute rights of the asset to the buyer (i.e. Sukuk investors). My question is; does beneficial sale accord absolute rights to the buyer when challenged in court, given that the name on the title remains under that of the seller?

My opinion on the trading of banking stocks on the GCC stock markets - the reason why they are traded at a discount is due to the fact that stock valuation is done based on conventional norms. If stock valuation is done with Shariah considerations, it may yield different prices.

BAG uses the argument that the PU is merely a Wa’d (promise) which is not legally binding. If the PU is put to test and challenged in court, would the holder of the undertaking be compelled, by law, to honour the undertaking? If they are, then it is no longer a Wa’d but a legally binding contract instead.

Loan/top-up/liquidity arrangement in case of shortfall in profits – in equity based structures, are the managers allowed to do the same? BAG again argues that this arrangement is merely a Wa’d and therefore not legally binding. Again, will it stand if challenged in court?

A guarantee by a third (non-related) party is seen as an act of benevolence, it should not have any strings attached or payments charged.

The recurring argument of substance over form – different mazhabs have different opinions on the subject and all their opinions are valid from the Shariah perspective. Again, to overcome this obstacle, label a product based on the approving mazhab and let the market decide.

P.14, Col 1, para 6, last 2 lines – oxymoron, Musharakah is not a fixed income instrument.


My conclusions –

Musharakah = equity. Therefore, if we choose to structure a Sukuk based on the principles of Musharakah, we should also adhere to the principles that govern equity structures.

Shariah parameters are split between the 4 main mazhabs. Any stand or ruling must be accompanied by the basis, i.e. which mazhab it was based on. At the end of the day, it is for the market to decide which is best suited for their needs.

Bay al-Dayn

Mohd Johan Lee is an Islamic finance lawyer and managing partner of law firm J.Lee & Associates. In an article published by Reuters News on 24 June 2009 titled “No debt sales, no progress for Islamic finance?” he concluded the following;

It is indeed for the development of Islamic banking and monetary market that the sale of debt on spot be allowed. Without such practice, the creditors and bankers in an Islamic banking system cannot securitise their debts as practiced by the conventional system.

Thus, the permissibility of such debt sales is crucial to ensure the liquidity of the Islamic money market and Islamic banking system.

Without such debt sales, the Islamic finance industry can not be developed forward. This is because, without such debt trading, Islamic bankers will be stuck with their debt. As in typical banking practice, a low liquidity ratio would incapacitate the investment (and depository) business.

I’m not a lawyer or a Shariah scholar but one thing I stand by is practising Islamic banking the Islamic way, therefore I tend to not agree with his stand that “creditors and bankers in an Islamic banking system cannot securitise their debts as practiced by the conventional system, and therefore will at the losing end". My question is do we need to securitise like the conventional system? Do we need to securitise at all?

A securitisation usually involves the setting up of a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to purchase debt obligations (Receivables) from a corporate or financial institution (the Originator) and issuing bonds secured over this pool of Receivables. Most conventional securitisations have some form of credit enhancements and the most popular is selling the Receivable at a discount. Receivable is a debt and Shariah doesn’t allow selling debt above or below par.

Saying “without such debt sales, the Islamic finance industry can not be developed forward” shows that he doesn’t understand that the Islamic finance industry is partnership, trade and justice driven and not debt driven like the conventional economic system. The conventional fractional reserve banking system is a system based on debt and artificial money creation but the Islamic financial system is built on real, productive economic activities.

On the same note, I find the Islamic money market a bit of an anomaly; if Shariah prohibits the trading of money, what then is traded at the Islamic money market?

Sukuk Ijarah, Part I

Ijarah - is a manfaah (usufruct) type of contract whereby a lessor (owner) leases out an asset or equipment to its client at an agreed rental fee and pre-determined lease period upon the aqad (contract). The ownership, rights and obligations as the owner of the leased asset remains in the hands of the lessor for the duration of the lease. Any costs incidental to the usage are the responsibility of the lessee.

A Fixed Asset based Sukuk Ijarah should have the characteristics of a Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT). If I was to structure a Fixed Asset Sukuk based on the Ijarah contract, it would probably have the following characteristics:

Issuer:
An SPV owned by the Trustees on behalf of the Sukukholders

Principal Activities of the Issuer/SPV:
Owner, manager and Lessor of [warehouses/hypermarket/office, commercial, industrial, educational, residential buildings/ships/aeroplanes – thereafter referred to as ASSETS].

Tenure of Investment:
5 years (for example)

Structure Description:
Investors will receive Sukuk Ijarah issued by the SPV as evidence of their investment in the SPV. SPV shall utilise the investment proceeds to acquire ASSETS (as described in [the hypothetical] Appendix A). The legal title of the ASSETS shall be transferred to the SPV and held in trust for the Investors.

The ASSETS shall not engage or be a party to any activities contrary to or forbidden by Shariah.

The ASSETS shall be leased to the market at the appropriate lease rental rates (as verified by the appointed valuer or industry expert) and for a lease period not exceeding 5 years (or any number of years as agreed by the investors).

Any costs incidental to ownership such as taxes and insurance shall be borne by the Lessor.

Any costs incidental to usage, such as utilities expenses, repairs due to wear and tear and content insurance shall be borne by the Lessee.

Lease rental net of (minimal) SPV cost shall be remitted to Sukukholders half yearly (or annually, quarterly, monthly)

SPV shall instigate legal action against lessees who deliberately and fraudulently dishonour the lease agreements. Failure of the lessees to pay rental due to economic reasons does not require immediate legal action. Instead, a solution has to be found to ensure the lessees are able to resume payment of the rental soonest possible.

Investors wishing to exit the investment, at any time, may sell their share of ownership to anyone, at the prevailing market price of the asset. The prevailing market price shall be based solely on the market value of the asset or NAV.

At the end of 5 years, the ASSETS shall be sold to the market at current prices and Investors will receive their share of the sales proceeds according to their share of investment.
The investors may decide to continue with the investment if the so wish and investors wishing to exit the investment may dispose their shares in the manner described above.


Difference from some of the Malaysian Sukuk Ijarah in the market:

• Under this structure, the SPV assumes full legal ownership of the assets, not just the beneficial ownership.
• This structure does not have a purchase undertaking with a predetermined price, the properties are disposed to the market, at market prices.
• Rental is priced at the real market rental rate and not benchmarked against any interbank rate (LIBOR etc) or interest rates.
  

This structure is basically a REIT. It is not a mind-boggling alien structure that should be scorned upon so correct me if I’m wrong, why isn’t there any such Sukuk structure out the in the market?

Shariah Compliant vs. Shariah Based

The difference is quite obvious; a Shariah compliant product is one that meets all compliance criteria, it may not necessarily be Shariah based (like “Shariah compliant derivatives” for example) but it is sufficient that it does not contravene any Shariah ruling. A Shariah based product on the other hand is already compliant; it is after all based on Shariah perimeters which makes compliance automatic.

Shariah compliant products may have its origins in conventional banking. To make a financial instrument Shariah compliant, all that needs to be done is to remove those elements or components which contradict with Shariah and replace them with a Shariah acceptable concept. Multiple contracts may be used to facilitate and complete the transaction and inevitably some form of legal trickery could be involved. I would agree with the definition of a Shariah compliant product being a conventional product which has been “Islamised”. An example of a Shariah compliant product is an Ijarah transaction where only the beneficial ownership is transferred and not the legal ownership.

A Shariah based product is a financial instrument which is derived from the laws of Shariah. It may share some similarities with existing conventional products but it did not originate form any conventional products. Structuring Shariah based financial solutions is easier because there is no need to find ways to circumvent Shariah prohibitions in order to achieve Shariah compliance. A Mudharabah venture capital model is an example of a Shariah based product.

Making existing financial products Shariah complaint is an easy, short term approach. It will satisfy the market’s need for Shariah compliant products but it will not distinguish Islamic finance as an alternative model to conventional banking. Merely Islamising and making existing conventional products Shariah compliant will cause the Islamic finance sector to converge with the conventional sector. Convergence means being one and the same and since Islamic finance is not the same as conventional finance; convergence should not be allowed to happen.

BBA is an example of a Shariah compliant financial product whose roots can be traced to conventional debt based lending. As a consequence, the mechanics and pricing of a Bai Bithaman Ajil financing is identical to that of a conventional loan.

Being different products running on different concepts and platforms, convergence cannot happen even on pricing. An Ijarah based mortgage carries different risks compared to a collateralised debt based mortgage. Therefore, given the different risk elements of the two similar products, the pricing cannot be identical; it should reflect the underlying risks involved.

Islamic finance is an alternative to conventional finance and hence convergence should not happen.

Controller of Compliance

Dr Mohamad Nedal Alchaar, secretary-general of the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) declared at the IFN 2009 Issuers & Investors Asia Forum that his organization will determine the Shariah compliance of a product, and that this could be done from the latter half of next year.

This model of a central body deciding/monitoring/controlling Shariah compliance of financial products is not new; Bank Negara Malaysia and the Securities Commission is already playing that role (for the Malaysian market) as no product is allowed to be sold without their seal of Shariah compliance.

With a central compliance regulator, what will happen to the individual FI’s Shariah Advisory Committee (SAC)? What is their role? Are their decisions/recommendations binding? A central Shariah compliance authority could relegate their role to a mere secretariat, vetting Shariah issues before being approved (or rejected) by the central body.

A central, globally accepted Shariah controller of compliance being the standard setter and standard bearer could help in solving the standardisation issue. But, isn’t the OIC Fiqh Academy already doing that?

Any central body wishing to determine the Shariah compliance of a product would not be successful if standardisation of the Shariah interpretation is not in place. We should work towards that first.

Vulnerability of Islamic finance exposed?

Sukuk defaults expose vulnerability of Islamic finance

MANAMA/KUALA LUMPUR: First defaults of Sukuk are set to expose the vulnerabilities of Islamic finance, with most investors expected to have no better legal redress than conventional bondholders as underlying assets have not been truly transferred to them.

The current financial and economic crisis is a first for the $1 trillion Islamic finance industry, which over the past few years has been spoilt by cheap oil money, and legal provisions and protection clauses in Sukuk worth billions of dollars are being tested for the first time.

Islamic bonds, or Sukuk, are structured as profit-sharing or rental agreements and their returns are derived from underlying assets. Islamic finance caters to investors who would like to avoid paying or earning interest, prohibited by Islamic law.

Kuwait’s Investment Dar said in May it had defaulted on a $100 million Sukuk registered in Bahrain and in the United States a court case is ongoing on the East Cameron Partners Sukuk by bankrupt Texas-based East Cameron Gas Company.

Despite its earlier billing as a safer alternative to traditional banking due to its requirement for assets to underpin deals, Islamic bondholders may not have any more legal safeguards than conventional counterparts in case of default.

With rare exceptions, Sukuk issuers have created special purpose vehicles (SPV) to pool assets underlying the issue, but they have not been securitized for a true sale to investors.

“Secular, non-Shariah courts upholding those structures are more likely to consider Sukuk holders to have contractual rights as opposed to proprietary rights and as a result rank them as creditors rather than equity holders,” said Muneer Khan, partner and head of Islamic finance at law firm Simmons and Simmons.

A $650 million Sukuk issued by troubled Saudi group Saad, which is undergoing debt restructuring, for example is seen as an asset-based, rather than an asset-backed, Sukuk. Yields of the Sukuk jumped to above 70 percent in mid-June, as investors feared a default of the issue.

Most Sukuk are structured as asset-based instruments, rather than asset-backed securitization where “you always have a claim for that particular asset that has been sold to you as the investor”, said Megat Hizaini Hassan, an Islamic banking lawyer in Kuala Lumpur.

“Everybody is chasing the same assets if they have not been transferred to the name of the Sukuk holders,” said Samer Amro, senior associate at law firm Dewey LeBoef. Other uncertainties are likely to arise from Sukuk defaults, including a debate about how courts will interpret repurchase clauses which are structured to follow a controversial ruling by prominent jurist Sheikh Muhammad Taqi Usmani in late 2007. Taqi had ruled that repurchase guarantees found in most Sukuk contradict Islamic laws, as they violate the principle of sharing risks and returns.

“If you’re looking at the newer structures where the repurchase obligations are left to be determined at the time of repurchase, there may be some issues there,” said Megat Hizaini. “You don’t really know how the courts will treat it in the situation,” he said.

Islamic finance is governed by scholars’ rulings, national regulators and its own standard-settings bodies such as Bahrain-based AAOIFI, the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions.

“In the Middle East, it’s going to put to the test many of the legal protections that were originally built into the Sukuk,” said Mohammad Faiz Azmi, global Islamic finance leader at PriceWaterhouseCoopers, adding that countries in the region typically do not have bankruptcy laws as sophisticated as in Europe.

“When these Sukuk start to default, it would be very apparent which jurisdiction has a more robust system than others,” he said.

Corporates with perceived higher risks that are facing high borrowing costs and a sluggish regional IPO (initial public offering) market could use true Sukuk sales with full ownership transfers as an avenue to the capital markets.

“It adds some credit-enhancement, it adds credit-worthiness,” said Rizwan Khan, a senior associate at law firm Norton Rose.

But the paperwork involved in registering ownership transfers in the Gulf Arab region and restrictions on foreign ownership of land make true Sukuk sales difficult.

Issuers have to register the SPVs, to which asset ownership would have to be transferred, in Bahrain or the Cayman Islands, as regulatory frameworks in other Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait do not fully cover Sukuk structures. This turns the SPV into a foreign buyer, limiting the pool of assets.

“This is not going to change unless laws are enacted, in particular on the ownership issues,” Khan said.

Source: Reuters, Monday 20 July 2009 (27 Rajab 1430)


The article above highlights and proves how identical the Sukuk is with conventional bonds as most investors are not expected to have better legal redress than conventional bondholders as underlying assets have not been truly transferred to them. This will lead to Islamic bondholders not having any more legal safeguards than conventional counterparts in case of default because their structure is merely asset-based and not asset-backed where they have a claim for that particular asset that has been “sold” to them. To make it worse, the courts may regard the Sukukholders as mere creditors instead of equity holders.

A good way to address this issue is to ensure that future Sukuk issuances be done in the true Shariah spirit, especially when it comes to asset ownership. The transfer of assets in such transaction must not be done just for the purpose of making it “Shariah compliant”. In a Shariah based structure, the equity element is always present, the debt element comes later. It is not possible to structure a debt based Sukuk without having equity ownership first.

Islamic Hedge Funds?

"Hedge fund" is a term that was originally used to describe a type of investment pool that uses sophisticated hedging and arbitrage tools to trade in the equity markets and explicitly pursues absolute returns on their underlying investments. The most widely-accepted definition of a hedge fund is that it is a fund that uses leverage, shorting and options to achieve its investment goals, beginning with the protection of investor capital.

The first hedge fund was set up by Alfred W. Jones in 1949, the first to use short sales and leverage techniques in combination. In 1966, a "hedge fund" run A. W. Jones shocked the investment community because it outperformed all the mutual funds of its time, despite their huge 20% fee.

According to some experts, hedge funds are believed to be highly speculative and thus may run contrary to the Shariah prohibition of gharar. At an even more fundamental level, however, hedge funds use short sales to neutralise the influence of market forces; and short sales involve the sale of what one does not really own, which is haram.

Toby Birch of Birch Assets Ltd doubts whether hedge funds could in principle be Shariah-compliant, calling Islamic hedge funds "something of an oxymoron," being an area of controversy, where such structuring might obey the letter of Shariah, it is not compatible with the spirit.

Often, in structuring Shariah compliant instruments, a number of contracts are combined to achieve the desired result, a solution that meets the financial or investment needs. On the surface, combines two or more Shariah concepts may sound perfectly acceptable but indiscriminately doing so may lead to what Tarek Diwany describes as “contractum trinius”. Ahmed Abbas, of Bahrain’s Liquidity Management Centre, criticised such mechanisms as false to the spirit of Shariah. “I don’t care, if you take 20 Islamic steps in order to short sell, you cannot sell what you don’t own. “Islamic banking is not about drawing an Islamic veil over something un-Islamic.”

There have been many opinions and views as well as fatwas on whether hedge funds are Shariah compliant or not. We should be looking at the purpose of a hedge fund rather than the mechanics of the fund. This way hopefully we can up with a solution to the problem rather than modifying an existing (probably incompatible) instrument to solve the problem.

To "hedge" means to manage risk. The key word here is risk management. Our objective is to manage risk in a Shariah compliant manner. We shouldn’t be talking about Islamising hedge funds to manage risk, we should be finding means to manage risk which do not contravene Islamic laws. We should not be finding ways to Islamise hedge funds just for the sake of creating or adding to market liquidity and to enhance rice discovery.

Managing risk is permissible in Shariah based finance provided the means of managing that risk complies with the rules of Shariah. Managing risk can come in the form of full transparency, honouring contractual obligations, being accountable and acting in a professional way. Shariah based financial transactions are after all partnership and risk/reward sharing arrangements. Actions undertaken to manage and/or minimise risk should be directly related to the business venture by ensuring that it is undertaken in the proper manner.