Wednesday, September 30, 2009

The “will” to regulate

Islamic finance could also face a systemic failure and reputation risk unless there is a unified and dynamic regulatory framework applied not only domestically but also globally, warned an economist and former International Monetary Fund (IMF) executive director Dr Abbas Mirakhor.
He added that the industry may have more regulatory standards but there is no implementation of the standards in a unified manner and there is no organisation that supervises the instruments. Therefore, Mirakhor said that to ensure a decent chance of growth and development, one has to make sure the regulations are unified and accepted by all jurisdictions.
“We need to create a uniformed standardisation for Shariah products and at the same time you need a uniformed, comprehensive and universal regulatory system in place, which can have the authority of early warning when it comes to weak instruments," he said.
However, the question is whether it should be done via an association of Islamic banks or central banks that have Islamic Finance operating in its jurisdiction. Such arrangements are not difficult but it depends very much on the "will" of the participants, said Mirakhor. (Bernama)


In my previous posting, I made a feeble attempt at article review in which one of the points raised was the difficulty in finding a unified opinion due to the differing mazhabs followed by the different scholars. It was also raised that perhaps a product should be approved with a “warning” label as to which mazhab the approval was arrived at.

Speaking about “will”, a lot of jurisdictions leave the Shariah compliance and monitoring role to the individual banks, the question is, are the banks willing to let go of this “power” to approve products?

Given this major obstacle in reaching a unified stand, how then do we proceed with a global, central authority to supervise and regulate the industry? I feel the IFSB, AAOIFI, Fiqh Academy are global institutions which can (and should) play the regulators role, if allowed.

I agree with Mirakhor when he said a regulatory authority “needs to have enough mandate to supervise/regulate the policy”. Getting the mandate however, might not be so easy.

Monday, September 28, 2009

Article review – “Is AAOIFI Ban on Musharaka Sukuk Justified?”

A not so comprehensive review on the above article which appeared in the May/June issue of the Islamic Banker.

The title itself is misleading – AAOIFI did not ban Sukuk Musharakah, it is banning the current model of Sukuk Musharakah which has the elements of purchase undertaking (PU) and guarantees.

The gist of this article is based on the views of one mazhab overriding the views of the other mazhabs.

Badlisyah (BAG) – arguments for the Malaysian market player from the Malaysian (Shafie) perspective.

P.10, Col 1, para 3, line 4 – contradiction, Musharakah is NOT a debt instrument. It should not be treated as such as it defeats the purpose of structuring a Sukuk based on the principles of Musharakah.

P.10, Col 1, para 3, lines 6 to 10 – the Malaysian investors, market, legal and regulatory framework unfortunately does not support the Musharakah model. It is still a debt based market with debt based regulatory framework.

My opinion on the PU – giving debt characteristics to an equity based instrument. This is to satisfy the demands of the investing public who wants an “Islamic” structure but also wants the features of a debt.

My opinion on AAOIFI’s announcement - it should not create a panic, there should be a consensus on the “effective” date as in anything issued prior to the announcement should be given an exemption from the ruling.

Permissibility of debt trading – it is true that differing mazhabs have differing views, this is where the industry needs a respected global body to lay down the law as to which mazhab prevails. Alternatively, allow the practices of all mazhabs and leave it to the market to decide whether they want to subscribe to a certain issuance or not. In this case, each Sukuk issuance has to come with an additional label – that of the approving mazhab.

True sale versus Beneficial sale – BAG argues that it is merely an accounting issue. He contends that a beneficial sale is as good as a true sale (despite the asset still remaining in the balance sheet of the seller). The purpose of a sale in an Islamic transaction is to give absolute rights of the asset to the buyer (i.e. Sukuk investors). My question is; does beneficial sale accord absolute rights to the buyer when challenged in court, given that the name on the title remains under that of the seller?

My opinion on the trading of banking stocks on the GCC stock markets - the reason why they are traded at a discount is due to the fact that stock valuation is done based on conventional norms. If stock valuation is done with Shariah considerations, it may yield different prices.

BAG uses the argument that the PU is merely a Wa’d (promise) which is not legally binding. If the PU is put to test and challenged in court, would the holder of the undertaking be compelled, by law, to honour the undertaking? If they are, then it is no longer a Wa’d but a legally binding contract instead.

Loan/top-up/liquidity arrangement in case of shortfall in profits – in equity based structures, are the managers allowed to do the same? BAG again argues that this arrangement is merely a Wa’d and therefore not legally binding. Again, will it stand if challenged in court?

A guarantee by a third (non-related) party is seen as an act of benevolence, it should not have any strings attached or payments charged.

The recurring argument of substance over form – different mazhabs have different opinions on the subject and all their opinions are valid from the Shariah perspective. Again, to overcome this obstacle, label a product based on the approving mazhab and let the market decide.

P.14, Col 1, para 6, last 2 lines – oxymoron, Musharakah is not a fixed income instrument.


My conclusions –

Musharakah = equity. Therefore, if we choose to structure a Sukuk based on the principles of Musharakah, we should also adhere to the principles that govern equity structures.

Shariah parameters are split between the 4 main mazhabs. Any stand or ruling must be accompanied by the basis, i.e. which mazhab it was based on. At the end of the day, it is for the market to decide which is best suited for their needs.

Friday, September 18, 2009

The Derivatives Debate

Derivatives are contracts which derive (hence the name derivative) its value from an underlying asset. Derivative contracts are used to manage risk, manage uncertainty, which is Shariah complaint. If this is so, why is there continuous debate and dispute on the status of derivatives from the Shariah perspective?

Agil Natt, chief executive of INCEIF points out that Islam encourages managing risk but he also asks how do you draw the line between risk management and gambling/speculating?

His comments are valid in the sense that the two reasons investors use derivatives are for risk management/hedging and speculation. The irony is that these two types of investors often work against each other; hedging aims to protect an investor from a volatile market (by taking an offsetting position to the investor's current position) while the speculator loves volatility, his objective is to profit from a rise or a fall in the price of a security.

Over time, simple derivative contracts like forwards have evolved into futures, options and the more complex credit default swaps and even OTC bets on bond defaults.

If the objective is to manage risk, financial instruments should focus on that – risk management. Regulators and product developers must not allow any speculative elements and/or opportunities to exist in the risk management process.

Mufti Taqi Usmani of the Fiqh Academy of Jeddah in an article answering a set of posed questions on the topic (New Horison, June 1996, pp 10-11), argues that futures contracts are invalid because:

"Firstly, it is a well recognized principle of the Shariah that purchase or sale cannot be affected for a future date. Therefore, all forward and futures contracts are invalid in Shariah; secondly, because in most futures transactions delivery of the commodities or their possession is not intended. In most cases the transactions end up with the settlement of the difference in price only, which is not allowed in the Shariah."

The Editorial of islamic-finance.com has this to say about derivatives:
"We can protect you against market volatility" the investment bankers tell their clients. But the market volatility is caused by the activities of those very same investment bankers, and so the clients are sold nothing for something. Protection against a danger that never needed to exist in the first place. Sadly, the world learned little from the derivatives explosion. By the time the internet boom collapsed, a new generation of clients was learning about the motivations that really drive bankers and advisors. The clients tend to be offered the products that provide financial institutions with the highest profit margin.

Shariah has no objections to hedging one’s risk but the industry participants must ensure that the risk management tools are Shariah based and not used for speculative purposes.

Tuesday, September 8, 2009

Bay al-Dayn

Mohd Johan Lee is an Islamic finance lawyer and managing partner of law firm J.Lee & Associates. In an article published by Reuters News on 24 June 2009 titled “No debt sales, no progress for Islamic finance?” he concluded the following;

It is indeed for the development of Islamic banking and monetary market that the sale of debt on spot be allowed. Without such practice, the creditors and bankers in an Islamic banking system cannot securitise their debts as practiced by the conventional system.

Thus, the permissibility of such debt sales is crucial to ensure the liquidity of the Islamic money market and Islamic banking system.

Without such debt sales, the Islamic finance industry can not be developed forward. This is because, without such debt trading, Islamic bankers will be stuck with their debt. As in typical banking practice, a low liquidity ratio would incapacitate the investment (and depository) business.

I’m not a lawyer or a Shariah scholar but one thing I stand by is practising Islamic banking the Islamic way, therefore I tend to not agree with his stand that “creditors and bankers in an Islamic banking system cannot securitise their debts as practiced by the conventional system, and therefore will at the losing end". My question is do we need to securitise like the conventional system? Do we need to securitise at all?

A securitisation usually involves the setting up of a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to purchase debt obligations (Receivables) from a corporate or financial institution (the Originator) and issuing bonds secured over this pool of Receivables. Most conventional securitisations have some form of credit enhancements and the most popular is selling the Receivable at a discount. Receivable is a debt and Shariah doesn’t allow selling debt above or below par.

Saying “without such debt sales, the Islamic finance industry can not be developed forward” shows that he doesn’t understand that the Islamic finance industry is partnership, trade and justice driven and not debt driven like the conventional economic system. The conventional fractional reserve banking system is a system based on debt and artificial money creation but the Islamic financial system is built on real, productive economic activities.

On the same note, I find the Islamic money market a bit of an anomaly; if Shariah prohibits the trading of money, what then is traded at the Islamic money market?

Monday, September 7, 2009

AAOIFI Shari’ah Resolutions: Issues on Sukuk

Issuer: Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI).

The Shari'ah Board of the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), in view of the increased use of Sukuk worldwide, the public interest in them, and the observations and questions raised about them, studied the subject of the issuance of Sukuk in three sessions; first, in al-Madinah al-Munawwarah, on 12 Jumada al-Akhirah 1428 AH (27 June 2007), second, in Makkah al-Mukarramah, on 26 Sh'aban 1428 AH (8 September 2007), and third, in the Kingdom of Bahrain on 7 and 8 Safar 1429AH (13 and 14 February 2008).

Following the meeting of the working group, appointed by the Board, which met in Bahrain, on 6 Muharram 1429AH (15 January 2007), which was also attended by a significant number of representatives from various Islamic banks and financial institutions, the working group presented its report to the Shari'ah Board.

After taking into consideration the deliberations in these meetings and reviewing the papers and studies presented therein, the Shari'ah Board - while re-affirming the rules provided in the AAOIFI Shari'ah Standards concerning Sukuk - advises Islamic financial institutions and Shari'ah Supervisory Boards to adhere to the following matters when issuing Sukuk:

1. Sukuk, to be tradable, must be owned by the Sukuk holders, with all the rights and obligations of ownership, in real assets, whether tangible, usufructs or services, capable of being owned and sold legally, as well as in accordance with the rules of the Shari'ah, in accordance with Articles (2) and (5/1/2) of the AAOIFI Shari'ah Standard (17) on Investment Sukuk. The Manager issuing the Sukuk must certify the transfer of ownership of such assets in its (Sukuk) books, and must not keep them as his own assets.

2. Sukuk, to be tradable, must not represent receivables or debts, except in the case of a trading or financial entity selling all its assets, or a portfolio with a standing financial obligation, in which some debts, incidental to physical assets or usufruct, were included unintentionally, in accordance with the guidelines mentioned in AAOIFI Shari'ah Standard (21) on Financial Papers.

3. It is not permissible for the Manager of Sukuk, whether the manager acts as the mudharib (investment manager), or sharik (partner), or wakil (agent) for investment, to undertake to offer loans to Sukuk holders, when actual earnings fall short of expected earnings. It is permissible, however, to establish a reserve account for the purpose of covering such shortfalls to the extent possible, provided the same is mentioned in the prospectus. It is not objectionable to distribute expected earnings, on account, in accordance with Article (8/8)3 of the AAOIFI Shari'ah Standard (13) on Mudaraba, or to obtain project financing on account of the Sukuk holders.

4. It is not permissible for the mudharib (investment manager), sharik (partner), or wakil (agent) to undertake {now} to re-purchase the assets from Sukuk holders or from one who holds them, for its nominal value, when the Sukuk are extinguished, at the end of its maturity. It is, however, permissible to undertake the purchase on the basis of the net value of assets, its market value, fair value or a price to be agreed, at the time of their actual purchase, in accordance with Article (3/1/6/2) of AAOIFI Shari'ah Standard (12) on Sharikah (Musharaka) and Modern Corporations, and Articles (2/2/1) and (2/2/2) of the AAOIFI Shari'ah Standard (5) on Guarantees. It is known that a Sukuk manager is a guarantor of the capital, at its nominal value, in case of his negligent acts or omissions or his non-compliance with the investor's conditions, whether the manager is a mudharib (investment manager), sharik (partner) or wakil (agent) for investments.

In case the assets of Sukuk of al-musharaka, mudharabah, or wakalah for investment are of lesser value than the leased assets of ‘Lease to Own’ contracts (Ijarah Muntahia Bittamleek), then it is permissible for the Sukuk manager to undertake to purchase those assets - at the time the Sukuk are extinguished - for the remaining rental value of the remaining assets; since it actually represents its net value.

5. It is permissible for a lessee in a Sukuk al-ijarah to undertake to purchase the leased assets when the Sukuk are extinguished for its nominal value, provided he {lessee} is not also a partner, mudharib or investment agent.

6. Shari'ah Supervisory Boards should not limit their role to the issuance of fatwa on the permissibility of the structure of Sukuk. All relevant contracts and documents related to the actual transaction must be carefully reviewed {by them}, and then they should oversee the actual means of implementation, and then make sure that the operation complies, at every stage, with Shari'ah guidelines and requirements, as specified in the Shari'ah Standards. The investment of Sukuk proceeds and the conversion of the proceeds into assets, using one of the Shari'ah-compliant methods of investments, must conform to Article (5/1/8/5) of the AAOIFI Shari'ah Standard (17).

Furthermore, the Shari'ah Board advises Islamic financial institutions to decrease their involvements in debt-related operations and to increase true partnerships based on profit and loss sharing, in order to achieve the objectives of the Shari'ah.

In the end, all praise is due to Allah, Lord of all the Worlds!

Universities Joining the Islamic Finance Bandwagon

Apparently, the Islamic finance industry was not badly affected by the global financial turmoil. One of the main reasons for this is because they are not exposed to the toxic assets that brought down most of the other banks. The resilience of the Islamic banking industry may not be fully attributed to prudent credit management or exceptional management skills; they were saved by Shariah’s prohibition of speculation, gambling (maisir) and uncertainty (gharar).

This September will see new courses and postgraduate qualifications in Islamic finance springing up throughout the UK and elsewhere in Europe. This development is sort of unusual because a few years ago, Islamic finance was viewed with extreme skepticism, often associated with terrorism and human rights abuses.

In the UK, interest in the sector reflects the government's intention to promote Britain as an Islamic finance centre. The UK already leads Europe not only in the number of locally established Islamic financial institutions but also in the number of Islamic finance training courses it offers, from entry to postgraduate level. Last December, the Treasury published a paper setting out the government's aim for London to be "Europe's gateway to international Islamic finance". This acknowledged that the industry was still young and therefore not yet experiencing skills shortages, but predicted that it soon would be.

The Guardian, (Tuesday 28 July 2009) reports that a few UK Universities have responded positively to this new opportunity. Newcastle University is offering an MSc. in finance and law with Islamic finance from next academic year. Henley Business School at the University of Reading has been offering an MSc in investment banking and Islamic finance since last year, with students spending the second part of the year in Kuala Lumpur. The University of Bangor in Wales has also been running its Islamic finance MA and MSc for a year and is considering introducing a new MBA in the subject, while the first students to take an Islamic finance option as part of an executive MBA offered in Dubai by Cass Business School will graduate this summer. Durham, which has been offering postgraduate research degrees in Islamic finance for some time, is now introducing a taught MA and MSc (the MSc is more quantitative), to respond to demand. Elsewhere in Europe, Reims Management School is offering a new specialist course in Islamic banking and finance for students on its masters in management programme, taught in English.

Strangely, two specialist Islamic Masters programmes running in the UK a few years ago, at the University of Durham and Loughborough University, were cancelled. Durham still offers a summer school and is the world's largest research hub for Islamic finance, with 25 PhDs at work at the university, but Rodney Wilson, professor of economics at Durham, says there was simply not enough demand from the right students.

Stefan Szymanski, professor of economics at Cass says "You just have to measure how many billions of dollars Islamic finance already handles in a year, if that grows over the years; it (Islamic finance) will become a universal part of every business school."

This is a good development, it bodes well for the industry, let’s hope that the universities teaching Islamic finance courses possess the qualified teaching expertise and are not in it just to capitalise on the wave of interest in the subject.

Sukuk Ijarah, Part II – Transaction Flow

This structure applies the Ijarah Muntahiah Bittamlik contact.

Ijarah is a manfaah (usufruct) type of contract whereby a lessor (owner) leases out an asset or equipment to its client at an agreed rental fee and pre-determined lease period upon the aqad (contract). The ownership of the leased asset remains in the hands of the lessor for the duration of the lease.
Muntahiah Bittamlik describes the transfer of the title of the leased asset to the lessee at the end of the lease tenure.

The transaction flow for my version (as opposed to the version practised in the Malaysian market) of the Sukuk Ijarah is as follows:

1. The purpose of this transaction is to raise funds, therefore; the Issuer shall identify an (a pool of) asset(s) to be sold to the Investors. The Issuer enters into a Sale and Purchase Agreement with the Investors whereby the Legal ownership of the asset(s) is transferred to the Investors at the prevailing market price and on a willing buyer willing seller basis. The cash proceeds from the sale is utilised by the Issuer as they wish.

2. Trustees shall be appointed to hold the Assets in trust on behalf of the Investors. The Investors will have a pro-rata undivided beneficial interest in the Assets.

3. In the same session, after executing the Sale and Purchase Agreement, the Issuer will execute the Ijarah Agreement with the Investors. Under the terms of the Ijarah Agreement, the Issuer leases the Assets from the Investors for a predetermined period at a predetermined Ijarah rate. The Ijarah rate shall include two elements, the rental element and the asset price element.

4. The Issuer issues Sukuk Ijarah to the Investors as evidence of their lease and its obligations. The Investors are now known as the Sukukholders

5. Under the terms of Ijarah Muntahiah Bittamlik, the beneficial ownership of the Asset is transferred to Issuer at maturity of the Sukuk Ijarah provided the Issuer meets in full the obligations stipulated under the Ijrah Agreement.

6. In an event where the Issuer fails to honour its lease obligations, the Sukukholders (Asset owners) shall repossess the Assets and dispose them to the market to recover their investment.

Note: Steps 1, 2, 3 and 4 occurs consecutively in the same session.